EL7.AI
CryptoMedium•18 November 2026•
3 min read

Security Alert Flags Exploit Involving sBOLD Vault, Does Not Confirm Contract Suspension

Key Facts

1Liquity distributes 75% of the revenue from each borrowing market to stability-pool depositors.
2ChainSecurity’s audit of the sBOLD vault was completed on 2025-05-19.
3The audit report records two low-severity findings acknowledged by the team.

A security alert flagged an exploit involving the sBOLD vault operated by K3 Capital, but available reports have not verified that the company suspended the contracts on the Ethereum network. sBOLD operates as a third-party vault that automatically reinvests rewards for BOLD depositors in stability pools, according to Liquity documentation. The risk concerns depositors’ assets in the vault, which converts deposited liquidity into tradable shares. According to the security alert’s account, the exploit ended with the redemption of BOLD belonging to other depositors. No final estimate of losses, confirmation that funds were recovered, or information on the continuation of investigations could be verified, so these details cannot be presented as confirmed positions of the company.

The sBOLD vault operates on Liquity V2’s stability pools, but it is an external product that Liquity neither develops nor manages. Liquity documentation describes the vault as built and managed by the K3 Capital team, a third party. Users deposit BOLD into the vault in exchange for sBOLD shares, according to ChainSecurity’s audit summary. This structure allows liquidity to be pooled and converted into tokens representing each depositor’s share. The vault’s scope of responsibility therefore differs from that of the underlying protocol it uses.

Liquity says returns from stability pools come from borrower interest and liquidation gains. 75% of the revenue from each borrowing market goes to stability-pool depositors, according to the protocol’s documentation. sBOLD automatically reinvests rewards, rather than requiring depositors to redeploy them manually. This links the vault’s returns to the borrowing and liquidation mechanism in Liquity V2 markets. That connection explains the importance of accurately calculating the value of vault shares as assets move between pools.

The available account of the exploit describes a sequence beginning with a flash loan, followed by self-liquidation and the underpricing of vault shares, before collateral was swapped and BOLD redeemed. This sequence indicates that the risk concerns the interaction between borrowing, liquidation and the pricing of sBOLD shares, rather than simply transferring a balance from the vault. According to the alert’s account, the outcome was the redemption of BOLD belonging to other depositors. The verified facts did not include a confirmed estimate of the damage or a documented statement about recovered funds. The precise financial impact therefore remains unresolved.

ChainSecurity completed an audit of sBOLD on 19 May 2025, covering the vault’s contract code, not the Liquity V2 protocol. The report records two low-severity findings acknowledged by the project team. The audit summary said version 3 addressed value-extraction risks through self-liquidation and fixed issues in interactions with Liquity V2 pools that had been present in version 1. But the audit covered the code reviewed at that time and does not, on its own, establish or rule out the cause of the current security alert. The available facts included no documented position from K3 Capital on the suspension, losses or recovery of assets.