IAEA Does Not Know Whether Isfahan Facility Holds Nuclear Material or Is Operating
Key Facts
The International Atomic Energy Agency said in its February 2026 report that it had not conducted inspections or design information verification at the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant, known as the “IFEP,” by the end of the previous reporting period. The agency said it did not know whether the facility held nuclear material or was operating. This limits its ability to verify the facility’s status, without establishing that nuclear material is present there or that it is operating. Iran had declared the facility, but the declaration alone did not enable the agency to verify it on site. The issue comes amid a broader disruption to access to Iranian enrichment sites.
The agency’s February report said Iran had not granted its inspectors access to any of the four enrichment facilities it had declared during the reporting period. This describes the reporting period covered by the report issued that month and does not, by itself, provide a separate update on access status as of November 13. In the same report, the agency said the lack of access had prevented it from confirming the nature and purpose of activities at the affected facilities, including Natanz and Fordow. The agency therefore cannot verify on site what is happening inside those locations based solely on observations of activity. The issue highlights the importance of inspections in verifying the status of facilities, amid the access restrictions reported in that document.
In February, the agency observed regular vehicle movement near the entrance to the Isfahan tunnel complex, where it said uranium hexafluoride enriched to 20% and 60% uranium-235 for Iran’s declared facilities was stored. The agency’s description covered material associated with four declared facilities, but did not specify that the material was inside the IFEP itself. Iran told the agency that the facility and tunnel complex had been subjected to military attacks. The report added that Iran had not specified whether the facility contained nuclear material at the time of the attacks. This information remains tied to what the agency reported in February and does not constitute a current inventory of the facility’s contents.
The lack of access also affects estimates of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. In its February report, the agency said it could not provide current information on the stockpile’s size, composition or location, and had also been unable to determine whether enrichment activities had stopped. The agency estimated the total stockpile at about 9,874.9 kilograms on June 13, 2025, but that figure is a dated baseline and does not reflect a current inventory. This means that, based on the information reported by the agency, a comparison between the June 2025 estimate and the current situation remains impossible. Clarity on the stockpile is linked to inspectors’ ability to access and verify the material and facilities.
Iran told the agency that the normal application of safeguards had become “legally impossible and practically unworkable” under the circumstances imposed by the attacks and continuing threats. The agency also reported Iran’s description of the Isfahan facility and tunnel complex as having been subjected to military attacks. In June 2026, the agency said Iran had declared 22 nuclear facilities and another facility for nuclear material, but that, with the exception of the Bushehr plant, it had been unable to carry out its obligations at the other declared facilities. The agency resumed inspections and design information verification at Bushehr on June 1–3 in cooperation with Iran. The exception highlights the difference in access between Bushehr and the other facilities covered in the June report.
In its June 2026 report, the agency said it had asked Iran on February 6 to facilitate the examination and verification of design information at the Isfahan facility as soon as possible, then renewed the request on February 18 and asked Iran to facilitate the access needed to verify its account of the attacks. In an interview in April, Director General Rafael Grossi said the agency believed a large proportion of Iran’s highly enriched uranium had been stored in Isfahan since June 2025, but noted that inspectors had been unable to confirm the material or determine whether the agency’s seals were still in place. He also said inspectors had been scheduled to visit the new enrichment facility on the day the strikes began, after Iran had announced it in June of the year before the interview. On October 28, Grossi said the agency had observed no activity since June 2025 to repair or rebuild facilities damaged in the military attacks during 2025 and 2026, and called on Iran to allow inspectors into the nuclear sites. A return to inspections and verification of Iran’s account of the attacks remain among the steps requested by the agency, while current information on the facility and stockpile remains limited.