4 Ships Spotted Near 7 Cable Systems in Gulf of Oman; Analysis Examines Possible Targeting
Key Facts
Windward said in a report published on 29 October that it had spotted 4 ships moving near cable routes in the Gulf of Oman, including 3 U.S.-sanctioned tankers and an Iranian fishing support vessel. The company concluded that a pattern of slowing, circling, returning or switching off signals was consistent with the possibility of mapping cable routes or placing payloads or mines on them while transmissions were off. This describes an analytical assessment of vessel movements, not evidence that an operation was carried out. The report did not mention any damage or actual cable outage. The routes where the tankers moved carry 7 cable systems, placing the incidents near important regional and international communications infrastructure.
One of the most notable cases involved CELESTIAL SEA, an Iranian-flagged oil products tanker subject to U.S. sanctions. On 14 and 15 October, it circled near the 2Africa route for 4.3 hours, at a distance of 0.65 nautical miles, and at speeds ranging from 0 to 1.4 knots. On 15 October, its signals went dark inside the 2Africa and Bay of Bengal Gateway routes off Sohar. It remained dark for 86 hours, then resumed broadcasting on 19 October about 9 nautical miles from where it had disappeared. These details show a slow track near the route and a prolonged signal outage, while the report attributes the interpretation of their significance to Windward's analysis.
On 23 October, a large gas tanker left Shinas bound for Pasir Gudang in Malaysia, carrying about 494,500 barrels of Iranian liquefied petroleum gas. After 10 hours, its speed fell below 3 knots inside the 2Africa route for 42 minutes, before it turned back toward Oman. Windward's report did not identify the vessel. The company includes the slowdown and return in the pattern of movements it analyzed near the cables, without identifying the reason for the turn. The cargo, destination and timing remain details of the voyage cited in the report, not independent evidence of the purpose of the movement.
The third tanker, an Iranian-flagged very large crude carrier that was in ballast, lingered for about 10 days in Iran's exclusive economic zone between Jask and Chabahar. It was between 0.4 and 3 nautical miles from 4 cable routes: Europe India Gateway, Transworld, Bay of Bengal Gateway and SeaMeWe-4, and repeatedly switched off its signals. Windward said the 3 vessels belonged to networks that had transported oil for Iran's state oil company or Iranian military entities. It added that one of the tankers is operated by the National Iranian Tanker Company. This places the vessels' links in the context of Iranian oil trade, without establishing that every movement was tied to a specific action against infrastructure.
The fourth vessel was a 34-metre Iranian fishing support vessel that dredged alongside the Europe India Gateway and Transworld cables between 21 and 26 October at speeds below half a knot. Windward said the vessel entered waters it had not visited during 2 years of tracking, then headed north into Iranian waters and went dark. The list of 7 systems running through the routes includes 2Africa, Bay of Bengal Gateway, Asia Africa Europe-1, Oman Australia Cable, Europe India Gateway, Transworld and SeaMeWe-4. Ooredoo said the 2Africa system will reach Oman through landing stations in Barka and Salalah. These links underscore the presence of cable infrastructure in the region, while Windward said the ships' later locations could help determine whether the cables were their destination or a stop along the way.
Monitoring these routes matters because undersea telecommunications cables carry more than 99% of global data traffic, according to the International Telecommunication Union. A union report on the resilience challenges facing this infrastructure includes physical risks, longer repair times, geographic concentration of infrastructure and many countries' reliance on a limited number of systems. The union also noted that more than 170 submarine cable repairs were recorded in 2025, equivalent to about 4 failures a week on average. These figures provide context for the infrastructure's sensitivity to physical incidents, without linking them to the vessel movements Windward spotted. The company's report does not provide evidence of damage or disruption to any of the 7 systems.
The report came amid regional security tensions over data infrastructure. On 23 October, Reuters reported, citing two Iranian security officials, that Tehran had drawn up plans to target undersea telecommunications cables in the Gulf if the United States and Israel attacked it again. At the Manama Dialogue, Bahrain's foreign minister, Abdullatif Al Zayani, said Iran had continued to threaten data infrastructure, including undersea cables, until the previous month. Anwar Gargash said the UAE hoped for a diplomatic breakthrough in a Qatari-led mediation effort to avoid a new confrontation between Washington and Tehran. The Associated Press reported that the risk of escalation cast a shadow over the 3-day security forum in Manama. This context remains separate from Windward's assessment of maritime traffic, while the company said the appearance of the 3 tankers that were still dark when the report was published could reveal whether the cables were their destination or a stop along the way.