EL7.AI
GeopoliticsMedium•27 October 2026•
4 min read

440.9 Kilograms of Iranian Uranium Outside Verification Amid Agency’s Lack of Access to Sites

Key Facts

1The agency estimated Iran’s stockpile before the June 2025 war at 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%.
2The agency’s report dated 1 September 2026 said it had received no information about the status of declared facilities and nuclear materials and had been unable to access them since its previous report.
3Agency inspectors visited the Bushehr plant from 1 to 3 June 2026; it was the only facility they inspected in Iran since the previous report in February.
4The agency said seven declared Iranian nuclear facilities were affected by the attacks, while 13 other facilities were unaffected.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has been unable to access Iran’s declared nuclear facilities and materials since its previous report, according to the director general’s report dated 1 September 2026, leaving a gap that hinders verification of Tehran’s program. Available information does not establish that a new denial occurred on 27 October; Iran’s documented position dates to August, while the September report described continued lack of access. Mohammad Eslami, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, said the agency cannot demand inspections of sites that were attacked before inspection rules and protocols are prepared, adopted and communicated. That places the dispute over inspection conditions at the heart of the verification crisis, alongside questions about the state of the facilities and nuclear materials. Available sources did not report a response in oil prices or movement in safe-haven assets linked to these developments.

In its report, the agency said satellite images showed activity at damaged facilities, including the enrichment sites at Natanz and Fordow, but it cannot confirm the nature or purpose of that activity without on-site access. This means remote monitoring does not settle what is happening inside the sites and cannot replace inspections that allow direct verification. Reuters reported that the agency had not received permission to enter the Natanz and Fordow facilities since they were bombed, leaving the precise condition of the damaged facilities unclear. Director General Rafael Grossi, meanwhile, said the agency had no indications leading it to believe that a major transfer of nuclear material had taken place. But he stressed the need for verification, saying that “some material may have been lost” — a possibility that available indications cannot resolve without access.

One verification gap concerns Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Before the June 2025 war, the agency estimated that Iran had 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%. But the agency cannot provide information on the current stockpile’s size, composition or location, making the earlier estimate a historical baseline rather than a confirmed description of the present situation. Grossi told Reuters he believed most of the material remained, while stressing that this needed to be verified. That estimate remains separate from knowledge of how much actually remains or where it is located.

Bushehr was the only nuclear facility inspected by agency inspectors in Iran since the previous report in February; they visited it from 1 to 3 June 2026. The sites that were attacked remained outside the scope of inspections, according to Reuters’ reporting on Natanz and Fordow. The attacks documented by the agency date to 13 June 2025, when strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities began; the agency then withdrew its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons by the end of the month. Reuters also reported, citing the agency, that seven declared Iranian nuclear facilities were affected by the attacks, while 13 other facilities were unaffected. The reports cited did not detail the extent of damage at those sites.

In Isfahan, Grossi said Iran had notified the agency in June 2025 of a new uranium enrichment facility, which agency inspectors were due to visit on the day the strikes began. The inability to verify the facility forms part of the broader picture surrounding the damaged sites, without available information establishing what happened there. The agency described the lack of information about nuclear material and its inability to verify facilities as a proliferation concern and a compliance issue under the safeguards agreement pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It called for the matter to be addressed with the utmost urgency. In his annual report to the United Nations, Grossi said the technical work needed for a diplomatic agreement had been completed, and that a lasting agreement required the agency’s role in verification.